March 08, 2010
August 09, 2009
Southeast Asia Trip 09
July 19 - 26: Manila - Philippines
July 26 - 27: Singapore
July 27 - 28: Kuala Lumpur - Malaysia
July 28 - 31: Angkor and Phnom Penh - Cambodia
August 1 - 7: Yangon, Bagan, Mandalay, Inle Lake - Myanmar/Burma
August 7 - 9: Bangkok - Thailand
August 9: DC
July 26 - 27: Singapore
July 27 - 28: Kuala Lumpur - Malaysia
July 28 - 31: Angkor and Phnom Penh - Cambodia
August 1 - 7: Yangon, Bagan, Mandalay, Inle Lake - Myanmar/Burma
August 7 - 9: Bangkok - Thailand
August 9: DC
April 08, 2009
Lebanon’s 2006-2008 Political Crisis: The Ascendency of the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Axis
I spent nearly 2 months in Lebanon during the summer of 2008 studying Arabic at LAU in Beirut. I almost had to cancel the trip altogether when sectarian violence broke out in early May and brought the country to the brink of another brutal civil war. The conflict was diffused but the high tensions and hostility between Lebanon's rival sects continued after the Doha Agreement in late May and continued into the summer while I was there. I wrote this gem for my Diplomatic History of the Middle East class and is based on a lot of what I learned while I was in Lebanon. I actually arrived in Beirut after Hezbollah had just ended its occupation of Downtown Beirut. During the trip I had met with Walid Jumblatt (leader of the Druze), Nicholas Noe (editor of Voice of Hezbollah), Timor Goksel (UN Peacekeeper in South Lebanon), and many other experts on the ongoing situation in Lebanon.
This was Beirut a few weeks before I arrived.
Civil Unrest
Lebanese Army
Militants
This is on Hamra Road. I remember I used to walk down it almost every day in the summer since it's only a few blocks from LAU.
Lebanon is a country of ubiquitous duality. Mainly split between Sunnis, Shi'ites, Christians, and Druze, the Lebanese melting pot of cultures has repeatedly sowed the seeds of conflict and war throughout Lebanon's long-troubled history. In Lebanon’s most recent conflict is the balance of power struggle in the national government—between the anti-Syrian and pro-West March 14 Alliance and the March 8 opposition—in the macrocosmic context of the clash for control of not only tiny Lebanon but the wider Middle East between the West with its Arab allies and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. The high tensions finally exploded into armed conflict in May 2008 when Hezbollah violently seized and overran Sunni West Beirut and sectarian violence spread throughout the country as Lebanon was plunged to the brink of another sectarian civil war. Although the subsequent Doha Agreement signed on May 21 ended Lebanon’s 18-month domestic crisis, the worst political instability and sectarian violence since its brutal civil war (1975-1990), the agreement is more of a temporary settlement than a final solution as it fails to address and resolve the grievances that led to the crisis—especially Hezbollah’s arms—and therefore is ultimately a defeat for the West and its Arab allies who were forced to concede to the terms of the Hezbollah-led opposition.
The immediate causes of Lebanon’s 18-month political crisis go back to the 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah and the subsequent aftermath. To properly acknowledge the aftermath effects of the 2006 War, it is important to observe the domestic context in which the war occurred. On Valentine’s Day 2005, anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated by a massive truck bomb in Beirut. Many suspected Syria’s involvement and under immense international pressure and Lebanon’s anti-Syrian Cedar Revolution, Syria finally withdrew all its troops from Lebanon in 2005, ending a 29-year military occupation. But after the assassination, the Lebanese government eventually dissolved and Lebanon’s domestic politics basically split into two bitter rival camps in the power vacuum left by the departing Syrians. “One Lebanon is represented by a coalition of mainly Sunnis, Druze, and Christians that coalesced following the assassination of the former prime minister and Sunni Muslim Rafiq al-Hariri.”1 The anti-Syrian and pro-Western March 14 Alliance is composed of mostly Sunni and Druze and led by Saad Hariri, the son of slain former PM Hariri. The opposition, March 8, is composed of mostly Shi’a and led by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Amal. Christians are mostly split between the opposing factions, although the majority of Christians shifted to the opposition after their leader, Michel Aoun, was shut out of the 2005 elections. In the June 2005 general elections, the anti-Syria and pro-West faction won a majority in Parliament (the first time in fifteen years) and in the Cabinet, although Hezbollah officials gained minister positions in the Cabinet for the first time and the March 14 bloc was unable to secure a two-thirds majority in Parliament.
Before the much delayed internationally-backed ceasefire finally ended the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel had invaded Lebanon with the dual aim of destroying Hezbollah’s militia and rescuing its two captured soldiers, whose capture by Hezbollah fighters on July 12, 2006 provoked the brutal Israeli war machine’s response. The Israeli Army failed to accomplish its goals, as Hezbollah fighters, though outgunned and overmatched, successfully confronted and halted the much more advanced IDF invasion force. In the end, the war was therefore seen as a victory for Hezbollah as its political standing in Lebanon and in the region immensely surged after the war and its underestimated militia (considered the best guerilla army in the world) was perceived as having defeated the theoretically invincible IDF (considered the 4th best professional army in the world). By contrast, the pro-Western Lebanese government in power during the war was seen as incompetent for its failure to confront Israel and effectively rebuild Lebanon’s destroyed infrastructure in the aftermath. In an interview in Beirut between the author and journalist Nicholas Noe, he pointed out that according to a poll of Arabs across the Middle East, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah quickly became the most popular leader in the Arab world overnight.2 “[Hezbollah’s] impressive and rapid response to the needs of those whose homes and lives were ravaged…further consolidated Hezbollah’s impressive base of support.”3 The legend of Israel’s invincible army and its longtime deterrent power against its enemies was shattered in 2000 and further disproved in 2006, both times by Hezbollah. Hassan Nasrallah’s popularity is due to the fact that in the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, he is the only Arab leader to expel Israeli forces from occupied land through armed conflict.4 Hezbollah recognized its increased potential power after its “divine victory” in the war and sought to exercise its new political leverage to its advantage within Lebanon by directly challenging the government for power and increased Shi’a representation.
After the war’s end, Hassan Nasrallah sought to capitalize on Hezbollah’s increased political and military standing after the war and urged the opposition to protest the current government. In November 2006, the opposition withdrew Hezbollah and Amal ministers (plus one Christian minister) from the cabinet; thus the government was now illegitimate and unconstitutional since not all sects (Shi’a) were properly represented according to Lebanon’s constitution. In December, Hezbollah and the opposition began a massive political protest campaign directly challenging the government and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Siniora (a Hariri ally and pro-Western) and occupied downtown Beirut in an attempt to paralyze the government and enforce its own terms on it. Nasrallah called Siniora illegitimate and a “tool of the West” and the opposition refused to recognize him as the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Anti-government protests periodically escalated into riots and sporadic sectarian fighting spread from the capital throughout the country. “Hezbollah is using its arms and enhanced political standing in the Islamic world to attempt to change the delicate political balance of Lebanon’s sectarian government in its favor,” and Nasrallah challenged Siniora to “either agree to a new consensus arrangement, with a Hezbollah veto over all government measures, or face widespread demonstrations and other forms of organized pressure.”5 The opposition demanded a national unity government in which it would hold more than one-third of Parliament, thus giving it veto power over any legislation (especially concerning Hezbollah’s arms) and the power to dissolve the government. The opposition was additionally trying to hold early parliamentary elections to regain a majority in Parliament, something Hezbollah was sure of in the aftermath of its success and increased support after the war. The opposition refused to back down until the government “either accepted a national unity government or agreed to call elections.”6 But March 14 was simultaneously aiming to hold early presidential elections to replace pro-Syrian President Lahoud, who stayed in power even after the Cedar Revolution. March 14’s priority after the war was “to stop Hezbollah from using its arms and recently enhanced political standing from changing the sectarian system’s domestic political and economic balance.”7 The two factions remained deadlocked for months after both sides refused the other’s demands. Matters were further complicated when President Lahoud’s term ended in November 2007, and the presidency remained vacant as the two sides still remained deadlocked over a power-sharing agreement in the government. Lebanon was effectively left without a president for six months and a functioning government for over a year.
Like most conflicts in the Middle East, the Lebanese political deadlock concerns larger implications regarding both regional and global powers. The conflict in Lebanon pitted the West (especially the US) and its Arab allies (especially Saudi Arabia), who support March 14, against the alliance between Iran and Syria that supports March 8. “This alliance challenges the US, Israel, and Washington’s Arab allies for control of the Middle East.”8 The struggle over Lebanon was not just for control of the tiny country but is a wider regional battle between pro-Western and anti-Western forces that are using Lebanon to fight their proxy wars. “Hezbollah sought to increase the opposition’s share in the government, allowing it to block any potential legislation that threatened the party’s interests or those of its allies in Damascus and Tehran.”9 It is due to this complex relationship between domestic and regional dimensions that Lebanon remains so important to both sides. Instability in Lebanon both feeds and is fed by regional instability. The central issue at stake is simply power and balance of power, with a sectarian division (Sunni and Shi’a) underlying the ongoing conflict. "This is more and more becoming a Sunni-Shi'a conflict. It really does feel like Iraq," says journalist Nir Rosen.10 The Lebanese government’s refusal to give in to the opposition demands is due to US policy that would not simply let Iran get the advantage in Lebanon, “especially since it might well benefit Iran’s power projection into the wider Middle East.”11 This is a proxy war with the US and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran and Syria on the other. The stakes are high as Iran and Syria would find it unacceptable to let Hezbollah be contained, and the US and Saudi Arabia would find it unacceptable to let Iran and Syria control Lebanon through Hezbollah. As one Druze official simply put it, “If you lose Lebanon, you lose the Middle East.”12
Nasrallah had declared that the situation could remain deadlocked until the 2009 elections since he recognized the significant implications if the opposition resorted to using its arms against fellow Lebanese and escalated the crisis into armed conflict and risked a possible second civil war. Hezbollah’s occupation of downtown Beirut was strictly a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign. But on May 6, 2008, the government preemptively cracked down on Hezbollah’s telecommunications system and replaced the security chief at Beirut’s airport, a Hezbollah loyalist. The government argued that Hezbollah’s telecommunications system was illegal unless it would be absorbed into the national system. But Hezbollah argued that its telecommunications system was synonymous with its weapons and arms as it was vital to its military operations against Israel (especially during the 2006 War) and could not incorporate it into Lebanon’s because it had been infiltrated and monitored by Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad. On May 8, 2008, Nasrallah stated the government’s actions were a “declaration of war” on Hezbollah and he would be forced to take action to defend Hezbollah’s precious arms. Abandoning its longtime promise to Lebanon to never use its arms against Lebanese, Hezbollah was forced to show the government its seriousness in protecting its arms. The long-simmering tensions of the political crisis abruptly deteriorated into widespread sectarian fighting in Beirut and throughout Lebanon. Minutes after Nasrallah’s speech, Hezbollah fighters boldly took to the streets of Beirut and assaulted through Sunni West Beirut. Hezbollah, whose military wing is stronger than Lebanon’s Army, easily overran West Beirut as it routed and effectively disarmed Sunni gunmen loyal to the government, essentially capturing and controlling over half of the capital after just six hours of urban warfare. Fighting would continue for another two days as Sunni fighters attempted counterattacks but Hezbollah and its Amal allies remained in complete control of Beirut. The government condemned Hezbollah’s offensive and Saudi Arabia (who backs and supports the Sunni loyalists) charged it with attempting a coup by seizing Beirut. With control of the south, downtown, and now the west, Hezbollah paralyzed life in the city and blocked the road to the airport, thus closing Lebanon’s only air link to the outside world. Over the next few days, the violence further escalated and fighting spread throughout the country to Sidon in the south to the Chouf Mountains in the east and to Tripoli in the north.
The Lebanese Army refused to intervene in the fighting and remained neutral as Sunnis and Shi’a intensely battled in Beirut. The Lebanese Army is the only truly national aspect of Lebanon because it does not split itself over sectarian divisions like the rest of the county. Fearing another disastrous split among the Lebanese Army along sectarian lines, as occurred during the civil war, top commanders refused to intervene in the fighting as such a move would’ve only escalated and expanded the violence. It is also worth noting that “around 70 percent of the Lebanese Army’s troops are Shi’a (because they are the poorest community in Lebanon)” and as a result “the army is certainly not going to take Hezbollah on”13 as most soldiers are sympathetic towards, or even admirable of, Hezbollah and its more powerful and well-trained military wing. The Lebanese Army pledged to resolve the fighting by retracting the government’s measures and allowing Hezbollah to keep its telecommunications system and reinstating the security chief at the airport. The Lebanese Army called for all militants to withdraw from the streets and after Hezbollah handed over control of positions captured from Sunnis to the Army, Lebanese soldiers started to deploy throughout the city on May 13 strictly to prevent any more fighting and to diffuse the conflict. Although the immediate fighting had ended after almost erupting into civil war (it was the worst internal fighting Lebanon had seen since its civil war) the two factions still remained deadlocked in a political crisis and unless both sides could reach a formal agreement, the next outbreak of armed conflict would inevitably lead to a new civil war.
Recognizing the implications if the dangerous instability and civil unrest in Lebanon possibly spread throughout the region if not contained, Qatar’s Prince Hamad called for all Lebanese political parties to the negotiating table in Doha. All attendees were tasked with resolving the 18-month political crisis to avoid an inevitable civil war which would eventually drag in the rest of the region like the first Lebanese civil war had. On May 16, after 82 dead in a week, the Lebanese sent off their leaders with the message, “if you don’t agree, don’t come back.” Lebanese political leaders traveled to Doha (except Nasrallah because of security concerns) and held a national dialogue over the course of the next few days focusing on ending the current political crisis and ensuring a lasting peace among Lebanese society. An agreement was finally reached on May 21 and the seemingly unending 18-month period of political crisis, bombings, instability, riots, assassinations, civil unrest, and almost civil war was finally brought to an end. The parties agreed to immediately elect Army Chief Michel Sleiman as the next president and to form a national unity government in which the opposition would be granted eleven minister posts in the Cabinet. The parties also succeeded in passing a new electoral law redrawing constituencies in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Further points in the agreement stressed the prohibition of utilizing force to achieve political gains, although it did not contain any stipulations regarding a violation of this. Immediately upon the agreement’s acceptance, the Hezbollah-led opposition finally ended its occupation of downtown Beirut and on May 25 General Sleiman was finally elected to be President.
The Doha Agreement in the international context was a definitive victory for Iran and Syria, as its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, emerged with even more political power in the Lebanese government. “Iran demonstrated that it, not the United States, is the central power broker.”14 The deal “was quietly opposed by the U.S., in part because it would increase the formal power of Hezbollah within the Lebanese government.”15 and “the abandonment of the government's demand to dismantle Hizbollah's secret telecommunication system was a final seal of its failure.”16 The insufficient backing of March 14 was what led to the Lebanese government being forced to make concessions to March 8. At a meeting at his private compound in the Chouf Mountains in central Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze, complained to the author, “Where was the United States when we tried to fight off Hezbollah?”17 The Saudi backing and support of the Sunni bloc was also embarrassed when Beirut was so easily captured by Shi’a fighters, and the ineffective Sunni militias (armed by Saudi Arabia) in Beirut were routed and disarmed by the opposition. “[The Sunni militias] just disappeared and caused a great sense of betrayal and shock among Sunnis."18 During a conversation between the author and journalist Gwynne Dyer, he stated that the US has given more than $400 million to the Lebanese Army in an attempt to bolster it as a counterweight to Hezbollah, but the Lebanese Army still remains vastly outmatched by Hezbollah, and it stood by as a neutral force while Hezbollah defeated the US’s Sunni and Druze allies.19 “But even with the U.S. putting international pressure on Hezbollah and Iran, and providing ‘practical assistance’ to the Lebanese Army to deal with domestic security threats… Hezbollah has drawn the red lines. So far, the army hasn't crossed them.”20 With momentum on their side after the 2006 War with Israel and the 2008 Doha Agreement, Iran and Syria were able to further their successes in Lebanon with the opposition’s victory. Although Syria had left Lebanon militarily in 2005 after the Cedar Revolution, it still exercises a significant degree of influence through Hezbollah. President Bush’s policy in Lebanon was shattered as his once proclaimed Cedar Revolution was voided. The Doha Agreement exemplified decreased influence from the US and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, as the deal was brokered not by them but by the Qataris, and in the end Iranian and Syrian interests triumphed with Hezbollah’s gains. Hezbollah displayed its impressive military strength in 2006 against Israel and in 2008 against the March 14 Alliance, and, like its successes in 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah was able to achieve more through intense warfare than through prolonged diplomacy, setting a dangerous precedent for further conflicts in the Middle East. In fact it was only the following year in 2007 when its ally Hamas violently seized the Gaza Strip from Fatah. As Robert Fisk points out, Hizbollah has just won a domestic war in Lebanon, as total as Hamas's war in Gaza.”21 With little expense to itself, "Hezbollah used force and won. (The ruling bloc) had to retreat and we are back to an internal accommodation of Hezbollah.”22 The Doha Agreement had essentially shifted the balance of power in the Middle East in Iran and Syria’s favor.
In the domestic arena of Lebanon’s infamous politics, although early parliamentary elections wouldn’t take place, the new electoral law in the Doha Agreement redrew constituencies in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley so as to give the opposition an increased advantage in the 2009 elections to regain its majority in the Parliament. Siniora will remain Prime Minister until then and will be replaced by Hariri (or someone else in March 14), but the new cabinet will consist of eleven posts for the opposition. Furthermore, three posts are reserved for the president to choose. President Sleiman is seen as pro-Syrian and pro-Hezbollah and was not a favorite for March 14. Hezbollah gained a domestic victory with the presidential election as it was not a member of March 14 that was elected. Therefore, for the most part the three posts left up to the president will most likely be Hezbollah members or allies, bringing the total of March 8 ministers to fourteen and granting the opposition with veto power over any anti-opposition legislation, particularly the sensitive issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. "The basic problem that was illustrated in the July war has not been resolved [in the Doha Agreement], and that is the issue of Hezbollah's weapons."23 Many thought Nasrallah had made a huge mistake when Hezbollah used its arms against Lebanese for the first time. Hezbollah had always promised not to because they were solely meant as a resistance to Israel—since the Army was too weak—and this is what gave it legitimacy in arming itself. Adding more legitimacy to Hezbollah’s arms, an August 2008 government draft policy stated: “[it is] the right of Lebanon's people, the army and the resistance to liberate all its territories.”24
Although the Taif Agreement, UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, and the Doha Agreement call for “all militias to disarm” in Lebanon, Hezbollah and many of its supporters contend that this does not apply to Hezbollah. They argue that Hezbollah is not a militia but a “national resistance” and its arms are needed to defend Lebanon against Israeli aggression, along with what is perceived as an Israeli occupation of Lebanon’s Shebaa Farms. Nevertheless, Hezbollah had gained another success because any legislation that March 14 would try to pass forcing Hezbollah to disarm would simply be vetoed by the opposition. Hezbollah will not disarm or absorb itself into the weaker Lebanese Army anytime soon.
In the ongoing struggle between domestic, regional and global forces, Lebanon has historically oscillated between victories and defeats for both pro-Western and anti-Western factions. The US-Saudi Arabia-March 14 Alliance had scored a victory with the Cedar Revolution in 2005 but the tables have turned since then with the 2008 Doha Agreement. The incumbent Lebanese government is facing a resurgent Hezbollah-led opposition with increased political standing and leverage, as well as a definitive armed advantage that it will definitely not simply give up. The US and Saudi Arabia have effectively lost a certain degree of influence in Lebanon to the alliance of Iran and Syria that now has the upper hand. The Doha Agreement exemplifies a defeat for the US-Saudi Arabia-March 14 Alliance but more importantly it also represents a dangerous precedent for Lebanon itself. If Hezbollah is willing to use brute force to achieve political gains, then there is still the possibility that another armed conflict could erupt next year in the wake of the 2009 parliamentary elections or anytime in the future. Like all other theoretical agreements in Lebanon’s long-troubled and tragic past, the Doha Agreement is only a temporary settlement as Lebanon will continue to be dragged through further inevitable violent instability before the country ever achieves a lasting civil peace.
This was Beirut a few weeks before I arrived.
Civil Unrest
Lebanese Army
Militants
This is on Hamra Road. I remember I used to walk down it almost every day in the summer since it's only a few blocks from LAU.
Lebanon is a country of ubiquitous duality. Mainly split between Sunnis, Shi'ites, Christians, and Druze, the Lebanese melting pot of cultures has repeatedly sowed the seeds of conflict and war throughout Lebanon's long-troubled history. In Lebanon’s most recent conflict is the balance of power struggle in the national government—between the anti-Syrian and pro-West March 14 Alliance and the March 8 opposition—in the macrocosmic context of the clash for control of not only tiny Lebanon but the wider Middle East between the West with its Arab allies and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. The high tensions finally exploded into armed conflict in May 2008 when Hezbollah violently seized and overran Sunni West Beirut and sectarian violence spread throughout the country as Lebanon was plunged to the brink of another sectarian civil war. Although the subsequent Doha Agreement signed on May 21 ended Lebanon’s 18-month domestic crisis, the worst political instability and sectarian violence since its brutal civil war (1975-1990), the agreement is more of a temporary settlement than a final solution as it fails to address and resolve the grievances that led to the crisis—especially Hezbollah’s arms—and therefore is ultimately a defeat for the West and its Arab allies who were forced to concede to the terms of the Hezbollah-led opposition.
The immediate causes of Lebanon’s 18-month political crisis go back to the 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah and the subsequent aftermath. To properly acknowledge the aftermath effects of the 2006 War, it is important to observe the domestic context in which the war occurred. On Valentine’s Day 2005, anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated by a massive truck bomb in Beirut. Many suspected Syria’s involvement and under immense international pressure and Lebanon’s anti-Syrian Cedar Revolution, Syria finally withdrew all its troops from Lebanon in 2005, ending a 29-year military occupation. But after the assassination, the Lebanese government eventually dissolved and Lebanon’s domestic politics basically split into two bitter rival camps in the power vacuum left by the departing Syrians. “One Lebanon is represented by a coalition of mainly Sunnis, Druze, and Christians that coalesced following the assassination of the former prime minister and Sunni Muslim Rafiq al-Hariri.”1 The anti-Syrian and pro-Western March 14 Alliance is composed of mostly Sunni and Druze and led by Saad Hariri, the son of slain former PM Hariri. The opposition, March 8, is composed of mostly Shi’a and led by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Amal. Christians are mostly split between the opposing factions, although the majority of Christians shifted to the opposition after their leader, Michel Aoun, was shut out of the 2005 elections. In the June 2005 general elections, the anti-Syria and pro-West faction won a majority in Parliament (the first time in fifteen years) and in the Cabinet, although Hezbollah officials gained minister positions in the Cabinet for the first time and the March 14 bloc was unable to secure a two-thirds majority in Parliament.
Before the much delayed internationally-backed ceasefire finally ended the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel had invaded Lebanon with the dual aim of destroying Hezbollah’s militia and rescuing its two captured soldiers, whose capture by Hezbollah fighters on July 12, 2006 provoked the brutal Israeli war machine’s response. The Israeli Army failed to accomplish its goals, as Hezbollah fighters, though outgunned and overmatched, successfully confronted and halted the much more advanced IDF invasion force. In the end, the war was therefore seen as a victory for Hezbollah as its political standing in Lebanon and in the region immensely surged after the war and its underestimated militia (considered the best guerilla army in the world) was perceived as having defeated the theoretically invincible IDF (considered the 4th best professional army in the world). By contrast, the pro-Western Lebanese government in power during the war was seen as incompetent for its failure to confront Israel and effectively rebuild Lebanon’s destroyed infrastructure in the aftermath. In an interview in Beirut between the author and journalist Nicholas Noe, he pointed out that according to a poll of Arabs across the Middle East, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah quickly became the most popular leader in the Arab world overnight.2 “[Hezbollah’s] impressive and rapid response to the needs of those whose homes and lives were ravaged…further consolidated Hezbollah’s impressive base of support.”3 The legend of Israel’s invincible army and its longtime deterrent power against its enemies was shattered in 2000 and further disproved in 2006, both times by Hezbollah. Hassan Nasrallah’s popularity is due to the fact that in the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, he is the only Arab leader to expel Israeli forces from occupied land through armed conflict.4 Hezbollah recognized its increased potential power after its “divine victory” in the war and sought to exercise its new political leverage to its advantage within Lebanon by directly challenging the government for power and increased Shi’a representation.
After the war’s end, Hassan Nasrallah sought to capitalize on Hezbollah’s increased political and military standing after the war and urged the opposition to protest the current government. In November 2006, the opposition withdrew Hezbollah and Amal ministers (plus one Christian minister) from the cabinet; thus the government was now illegitimate and unconstitutional since not all sects (Shi’a) were properly represented according to Lebanon’s constitution. In December, Hezbollah and the opposition began a massive political protest campaign directly challenging the government and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Siniora (a Hariri ally and pro-Western) and occupied downtown Beirut in an attempt to paralyze the government and enforce its own terms on it. Nasrallah called Siniora illegitimate and a “tool of the West” and the opposition refused to recognize him as the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Anti-government protests periodically escalated into riots and sporadic sectarian fighting spread from the capital throughout the country. “Hezbollah is using its arms and enhanced political standing in the Islamic world to attempt to change the delicate political balance of Lebanon’s sectarian government in its favor,” and Nasrallah challenged Siniora to “either agree to a new consensus arrangement, with a Hezbollah veto over all government measures, or face widespread demonstrations and other forms of organized pressure.”5 The opposition demanded a national unity government in which it would hold more than one-third of Parliament, thus giving it veto power over any legislation (especially concerning Hezbollah’s arms) and the power to dissolve the government. The opposition was additionally trying to hold early parliamentary elections to regain a majority in Parliament, something Hezbollah was sure of in the aftermath of its success and increased support after the war. The opposition refused to back down until the government “either accepted a national unity government or agreed to call elections.”6 But March 14 was simultaneously aiming to hold early presidential elections to replace pro-Syrian President Lahoud, who stayed in power even after the Cedar Revolution. March 14’s priority after the war was “to stop Hezbollah from using its arms and recently enhanced political standing from changing the sectarian system’s domestic political and economic balance.”7 The two factions remained deadlocked for months after both sides refused the other’s demands. Matters were further complicated when President Lahoud’s term ended in November 2007, and the presidency remained vacant as the two sides still remained deadlocked over a power-sharing agreement in the government. Lebanon was effectively left without a president for six months and a functioning government for over a year.
Like most conflicts in the Middle East, the Lebanese political deadlock concerns larger implications regarding both regional and global powers. The conflict in Lebanon pitted the West (especially the US) and its Arab allies (especially Saudi Arabia), who support March 14, against the alliance between Iran and Syria that supports March 8. “This alliance challenges the US, Israel, and Washington’s Arab allies for control of the Middle East.”8 The struggle over Lebanon was not just for control of the tiny country but is a wider regional battle between pro-Western and anti-Western forces that are using Lebanon to fight their proxy wars. “Hezbollah sought to increase the opposition’s share in the government, allowing it to block any potential legislation that threatened the party’s interests or those of its allies in Damascus and Tehran.”9 It is due to this complex relationship between domestic and regional dimensions that Lebanon remains so important to both sides. Instability in Lebanon both feeds and is fed by regional instability. The central issue at stake is simply power and balance of power, with a sectarian division (Sunni and Shi’a) underlying the ongoing conflict. "This is more and more becoming a Sunni-Shi'a conflict. It really does feel like Iraq," says journalist Nir Rosen.10 The Lebanese government’s refusal to give in to the opposition demands is due to US policy that would not simply let Iran get the advantage in Lebanon, “especially since it might well benefit Iran’s power projection into the wider Middle East.”11 This is a proxy war with the US and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran and Syria on the other. The stakes are high as Iran and Syria would find it unacceptable to let Hezbollah be contained, and the US and Saudi Arabia would find it unacceptable to let Iran and Syria control Lebanon through Hezbollah. As one Druze official simply put it, “If you lose Lebanon, you lose the Middle East.”12
Nasrallah had declared that the situation could remain deadlocked until the 2009 elections since he recognized the significant implications if the opposition resorted to using its arms against fellow Lebanese and escalated the crisis into armed conflict and risked a possible second civil war. Hezbollah’s occupation of downtown Beirut was strictly a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign. But on May 6, 2008, the government preemptively cracked down on Hezbollah’s telecommunications system and replaced the security chief at Beirut’s airport, a Hezbollah loyalist. The government argued that Hezbollah’s telecommunications system was illegal unless it would be absorbed into the national system. But Hezbollah argued that its telecommunications system was synonymous with its weapons and arms as it was vital to its military operations against Israel (especially during the 2006 War) and could not incorporate it into Lebanon’s because it had been infiltrated and monitored by Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad. On May 8, 2008, Nasrallah stated the government’s actions were a “declaration of war” on Hezbollah and he would be forced to take action to defend Hezbollah’s precious arms. Abandoning its longtime promise to Lebanon to never use its arms against Lebanese, Hezbollah was forced to show the government its seriousness in protecting its arms. The long-simmering tensions of the political crisis abruptly deteriorated into widespread sectarian fighting in Beirut and throughout Lebanon. Minutes after Nasrallah’s speech, Hezbollah fighters boldly took to the streets of Beirut and assaulted through Sunni West Beirut. Hezbollah, whose military wing is stronger than Lebanon’s Army, easily overran West Beirut as it routed and effectively disarmed Sunni gunmen loyal to the government, essentially capturing and controlling over half of the capital after just six hours of urban warfare. Fighting would continue for another two days as Sunni fighters attempted counterattacks but Hezbollah and its Amal allies remained in complete control of Beirut. The government condemned Hezbollah’s offensive and Saudi Arabia (who backs and supports the Sunni loyalists) charged it with attempting a coup by seizing Beirut. With control of the south, downtown, and now the west, Hezbollah paralyzed life in the city and blocked the road to the airport, thus closing Lebanon’s only air link to the outside world. Over the next few days, the violence further escalated and fighting spread throughout the country to Sidon in the south to the Chouf Mountains in the east and to Tripoli in the north.
The Lebanese Army refused to intervene in the fighting and remained neutral as Sunnis and Shi’a intensely battled in Beirut. The Lebanese Army is the only truly national aspect of Lebanon because it does not split itself over sectarian divisions like the rest of the county. Fearing another disastrous split among the Lebanese Army along sectarian lines, as occurred during the civil war, top commanders refused to intervene in the fighting as such a move would’ve only escalated and expanded the violence. It is also worth noting that “around 70 percent of the Lebanese Army’s troops are Shi’a (because they are the poorest community in Lebanon)” and as a result “the army is certainly not going to take Hezbollah on”13 as most soldiers are sympathetic towards, or even admirable of, Hezbollah and its more powerful and well-trained military wing. The Lebanese Army pledged to resolve the fighting by retracting the government’s measures and allowing Hezbollah to keep its telecommunications system and reinstating the security chief at the airport. The Lebanese Army called for all militants to withdraw from the streets and after Hezbollah handed over control of positions captured from Sunnis to the Army, Lebanese soldiers started to deploy throughout the city on May 13 strictly to prevent any more fighting and to diffuse the conflict. Although the immediate fighting had ended after almost erupting into civil war (it was the worst internal fighting Lebanon had seen since its civil war) the two factions still remained deadlocked in a political crisis and unless both sides could reach a formal agreement, the next outbreak of armed conflict would inevitably lead to a new civil war.
Recognizing the implications if the dangerous instability and civil unrest in Lebanon possibly spread throughout the region if not contained, Qatar’s Prince Hamad called for all Lebanese political parties to the negotiating table in Doha. All attendees were tasked with resolving the 18-month political crisis to avoid an inevitable civil war which would eventually drag in the rest of the region like the first Lebanese civil war had. On May 16, after 82 dead in a week, the Lebanese sent off their leaders with the message, “if you don’t agree, don’t come back.” Lebanese political leaders traveled to Doha (except Nasrallah because of security concerns) and held a national dialogue over the course of the next few days focusing on ending the current political crisis and ensuring a lasting peace among Lebanese society. An agreement was finally reached on May 21 and the seemingly unending 18-month period of political crisis, bombings, instability, riots, assassinations, civil unrest, and almost civil war was finally brought to an end. The parties agreed to immediately elect Army Chief Michel Sleiman as the next president and to form a national unity government in which the opposition would be granted eleven minister posts in the Cabinet. The parties also succeeded in passing a new electoral law redrawing constituencies in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Further points in the agreement stressed the prohibition of utilizing force to achieve political gains, although it did not contain any stipulations regarding a violation of this. Immediately upon the agreement’s acceptance, the Hezbollah-led opposition finally ended its occupation of downtown Beirut and on May 25 General Sleiman was finally elected to be President.
The Doha Agreement in the international context was a definitive victory for Iran and Syria, as its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, emerged with even more political power in the Lebanese government. “Iran demonstrated that it, not the United States, is the central power broker.”14 The deal “was quietly opposed by the U.S., in part because it would increase the formal power of Hezbollah within the Lebanese government.”15 and “the abandonment of the government's demand to dismantle Hizbollah's secret telecommunication system was a final seal of its failure.”16 The insufficient backing of March 14 was what led to the Lebanese government being forced to make concessions to March 8. At a meeting at his private compound in the Chouf Mountains in central Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze, complained to the author, “Where was the United States when we tried to fight off Hezbollah?”17 The Saudi backing and support of the Sunni bloc was also embarrassed when Beirut was so easily captured by Shi’a fighters, and the ineffective Sunni militias (armed by Saudi Arabia) in Beirut were routed and disarmed by the opposition. “[The Sunni militias] just disappeared and caused a great sense of betrayal and shock among Sunnis."18 During a conversation between the author and journalist Gwynne Dyer, he stated that the US has given more than $400 million to the Lebanese Army in an attempt to bolster it as a counterweight to Hezbollah, but the Lebanese Army still remains vastly outmatched by Hezbollah, and it stood by as a neutral force while Hezbollah defeated the US’s Sunni and Druze allies.19 “But even with the U.S. putting international pressure on Hezbollah and Iran, and providing ‘practical assistance’ to the Lebanese Army to deal with domestic security threats… Hezbollah has drawn the red lines. So far, the army hasn't crossed them.”20 With momentum on their side after the 2006 War with Israel and the 2008 Doha Agreement, Iran and Syria were able to further their successes in Lebanon with the opposition’s victory. Although Syria had left Lebanon militarily in 2005 after the Cedar Revolution, it still exercises a significant degree of influence through Hezbollah. President Bush’s policy in Lebanon was shattered as his once proclaimed Cedar Revolution was voided. The Doha Agreement exemplified decreased influence from the US and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, as the deal was brokered not by them but by the Qataris, and in the end Iranian and Syrian interests triumphed with Hezbollah’s gains. Hezbollah displayed its impressive military strength in 2006 against Israel and in 2008 against the March 14 Alliance, and, like its successes in 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah was able to achieve more through intense warfare than through prolonged diplomacy, setting a dangerous precedent for further conflicts in the Middle East. In fact it was only the following year in 2007 when its ally Hamas violently seized the Gaza Strip from Fatah. As Robert Fisk points out, Hizbollah has just won a domestic war in Lebanon, as total as Hamas's war in Gaza.”21 With little expense to itself, "Hezbollah used force and won. (The ruling bloc) had to retreat and we are back to an internal accommodation of Hezbollah.”22 The Doha Agreement had essentially shifted the balance of power in the Middle East in Iran and Syria’s favor.
In the domestic arena of Lebanon’s infamous politics, although early parliamentary elections wouldn’t take place, the new electoral law in the Doha Agreement redrew constituencies in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley so as to give the opposition an increased advantage in the 2009 elections to regain its majority in the Parliament. Siniora will remain Prime Minister until then and will be replaced by Hariri (or someone else in March 14), but the new cabinet will consist of eleven posts for the opposition. Furthermore, three posts are reserved for the president to choose. President Sleiman is seen as pro-Syrian and pro-Hezbollah and was not a favorite for March 14. Hezbollah gained a domestic victory with the presidential election as it was not a member of March 14 that was elected. Therefore, for the most part the three posts left up to the president will most likely be Hezbollah members or allies, bringing the total of March 8 ministers to fourteen and granting the opposition with veto power over any anti-opposition legislation, particularly the sensitive issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. "The basic problem that was illustrated in the July war has not been resolved [in the Doha Agreement], and that is the issue of Hezbollah's weapons."23 Many thought Nasrallah had made a huge mistake when Hezbollah used its arms against Lebanese for the first time. Hezbollah had always promised not to because they were solely meant as a resistance to Israel—since the Army was too weak—and this is what gave it legitimacy in arming itself. Adding more legitimacy to Hezbollah’s arms, an August 2008 government draft policy stated: “[it is] the right of Lebanon's people, the army and the resistance to liberate all its territories.”24
Although the Taif Agreement, UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, and the Doha Agreement call for “all militias to disarm” in Lebanon, Hezbollah and many of its supporters contend that this does not apply to Hezbollah. They argue that Hezbollah is not a militia but a “national resistance” and its arms are needed to defend Lebanon against Israeli aggression, along with what is perceived as an Israeli occupation of Lebanon’s Shebaa Farms. Nevertheless, Hezbollah had gained another success because any legislation that March 14 would try to pass forcing Hezbollah to disarm would simply be vetoed by the opposition. Hezbollah will not disarm or absorb itself into the weaker Lebanese Army anytime soon.
In the ongoing struggle between domestic, regional and global forces, Lebanon has historically oscillated between victories and defeats for both pro-Western and anti-Western factions. The US-Saudi Arabia-March 14 Alliance had scored a victory with the Cedar Revolution in 2005 but the tables have turned since then with the 2008 Doha Agreement. The incumbent Lebanese government is facing a resurgent Hezbollah-led opposition with increased political standing and leverage, as well as a definitive armed advantage that it will definitely not simply give up. The US and Saudi Arabia have effectively lost a certain degree of influence in Lebanon to the alliance of Iran and Syria that now has the upper hand. The Doha Agreement exemplifies a defeat for the US-Saudi Arabia-March 14 Alliance but more importantly it also represents a dangerous precedent for Lebanon itself. If Hezbollah is willing to use brute force to achieve political gains, then there is still the possibility that another armed conflict could erupt next year in the wake of the 2009 parliamentary elections or anytime in the future. Like all other theoretical agreements in Lebanon’s long-troubled and tragic past, the Doha Agreement is only a temporary settlement as Lebanon will continue to be dragged through further inevitable violent instability before the country ever achieves a lasting civil peace.
March 02, 2009
The Real Intentions and Aftermath of Israel’s Invasion of Gaza
I wrote this gem for my Arab-Israeli Relations class with Professor Alexander Bligh. A lot of it comes from the independent research I did in Israel and the Palestinian West Bank over winter break during Israel's war with Hamas. Enjoy.
Who will save Israel from itself?
The Israeli Defense Forces’ Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, beginning on December 27, 2008, was justified in the context of Israel’s right to self-defense as a sovereign nation against indiscriminate rocket attacks from Palestinian militants; or so the simple widespread perception goes. The actual reality, however, suggests Israel had other objectives than commonly assumed. Further examination not only proves the Israeli claim to be a distorted view of the conflict but that it is much more complex and complicated than portrayed in the mainstream media’s coverage. If Israel’s only goal was to cease the rocket attacks coming from the Gaza Strip to provide immediate security for Israeli citizens, it would have adhered better to the June 19 ceasefire and worked before its expiration to negotiate a long-term ceasefire with Hamas. Israel’s invasion of Gaza was not a justified war of self-defense or even of necessity but it was clearly a war of choice and of opportunity. The broader reasons why Israel invaded Gaza can be attributed to other factors that are not related at all to security but more relevant to the political context at the time including the IDF’s diminished deterrence capability, the upcoming Israeli elections, the marginalized Palestinian President Abbas and Palestinian Authority, and the transition period of the US administration. Furthermore, Israel’s invasion of Gaza has thoroughly undermined Israeli and US national interests and ultimately failed to provide a long-term improvement in Israel’s overall security situation in the region.
Israel and Hamas signed a six-month ceasefire on June 19, 2008 in which Hamas agreed to end rocket attacks against Israel in exchange for Israel ending its siege on Gaza by fully opening all border crossings. The ceasefire expired on December 19 and Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza on December 27. Israel and Hamas contend that the other had not fully respected the ceasefire and routinely violated it. In mainstream Western media, the Israeli and US narrative claim that Hamas, as a terrorist organization, was the main violator of the ceasefire and Israel was merely exercising its natural right to self-defense against rocket attacks coming from the Gaza Strip because Hamas refused to negotiate an extension of the ceasefire. This may be the widespread and accepted belief but it simply is not true. The ceasefire began in June 2008 and both sides had agreed to cease all military operations against the other. Hamas was required to cease any rockets being fired into Israel (whether from Hamas or other Palestinian factions), and Israel had to lift its blockade of Gaza. According to Israel’s Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), despite Israel's failure to fully lift its closing of Gaza’s border crossings the June 19 agreement actually resulted in Hamas significantly decreasing the rockets fired into Israel from hundreds in the weeks before the June 19 ceasefire to a total of less than twenty between June 19 and November 4 and only two the last two months of September and October. Israeli Defense Minister Barak and the ITIC were surprised with Hamas’ adherence to the ceasefire terms and its effective policies of cracking down on anyone firing rockets at Israel. But the significant event that first broke the ceasefire was on November 4 when the IDF conducted a raid into Gaza which resulted in the deaths of six Hamas members. Hamas and other Palestinian groups, whom the ITIC maintains were “careful to maintain the ceasefire,” fired rockets into Israel as retaliation to Israel’s violation of the ceasefire. The ITIC’s December 31 report confirmed that the June 19 truce was only "sporadically violated, and then not by Hamas but instead by ... ‘rogue terrorist organisations’" that were opposed to Hamas and whose interests included undermining the Hamas government by violating its ceasefire with Israel. Instead, "the escalation and erosion of the lull arrangement" only occurred after Israel provocatively killed six Hamas members on November 4 and then followed up with a further provocation on November 5 when Israel completely closed all of Gaza’s border crossings, even to critical aid shipments, that only intensified Israel’s siege and threatened a dangerous escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Despite the ceasefire being effective for only the Israelis, after the ceasefire expired on December 19, Hamas offered a renewed ceasefire to Israel on December 21, but only on condition that Israel actually ended its blockade this time in accordance with international law which prohibits collective punishment of a civilian population and defines any kind of blockade as an act of war. The June 19 ceasefire with Hamas was actually working quite well from Israel’s perspective until the IDF’s incursion into Gaza on November 4. Israel refused to renew the ceasefire because its intentions of Operation Cast Lead were simply not limited to mere rockets. By actually adhering to the June 19 ceasefire by lifting the blockade or renewing a ceasefire with Hamas in December, Israel would have guaranteed security for its citizens but it didn’t even try to negotiate with Hamas which could have at least mostly erased the rocket threat for another six months. In rejecting Hamas’ offer and never fully opening Gaza’s border crossings, Israel was placing its wider political interests as more important than the threat of Hamas rockets and therefore over the very safety and lives of Israel’s citizens. The Israelis only opened partially the border crossings with Gaza, and in late July Foreign Minister Livni declared that Gaza’s border crossings would never be fully opened unless Hamas released captured IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit, even though the original ceasefire clearly was not conditional to Corporal Shalit’s release. In an interview in Ha’aretz on December 22, IDF Brigadier General Shmuel Zakai, former commander of the IDF’s Gaza Division, severely criticized Israel’s violations of the ceasefire and for failing to see the potential strategic costs of its policies:
“[Israel failed] to take advantage of the calm to improve, rather than markedly worsen, the economic plight of the Palestinians of the Strip… When you create a tahdiyeh, and the economic pressure on the Strip continues, it is obvious that Hamas will try to reach an improved tahdiyeh, and that their way to achieve this is resumed Qassam fire… You cannot just land blows, leave the Palestinians in Gaza in the economic distress they’re in, and expect that Hamas will just sit around and do nothing.”
Instead, Israel not only sought to deter all future rocket attacks against Israel but to negotiate another ceasefire but this time with Israel possessing better negotiating leverage to achieve a ceasefire that is in Israel’s overall favor. Israel’s brutal 18-month blockade failed to achieve that goal so Israel took the opportunity to use its superior military to inflict massive, overwhelming damage against Hamas in order to corner it until it would agree to a ceasefire with conditions more favorable to Israel than the June 19 ceasefire, specifically the immediate release of Corporal Shalit. There were clearly alternatives to a military approach that were not exhausted enough or even attempted and more importantly, no ceasefire in Gaza will ever last or become effective unless both sides fully adhere to it, especially unless Israel completely lifts its siege. After the failed ceasefire expired on December 19, the IDF started its massive bombing campaign of Hamas civilian and military targets in Gaza on December 27. The Israelis rejected Hamas’ offer for a renewed ceasefire because its broader political interests went beyond its security against rocket attacks fired from Gaza.
First of all, the Israeli leadership was divided over the ceasefire even during its initial negotiating period, and Defense Minister Barak instructed the IDF to begin preparing for a war with Hamas while the ceasefire was being negotiated in June 2008. Many senior Israeli political and military leaders strongly opposed the June 19 ceasefire with Hamas, and looked for opportunities to reestablish Israel's legendary deterrent capability of using such overwhelming, massive force against its enemies that they would be discouraged to ever attack Israel. The legend of Israel’s invincible army and its longtime deterrent power against its enemies was shattered in 2000 and further disproved in 2006, both times against Hezbollah, as well as a result of Israel’s 2005 unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Stephen Walt points out that “its ability to use force to achieve larger strategic objectives has declined significantly over time.” And because of this Israelis have always emphasized in recent years the importance of restoring the IDF’s deterrence capability because although the IDF is the best military force in the Middle East and will undoubtedly win battles and achieve tactical successes, this does not necessarily lead to long-term improvements in Israel’s overall regional security situation. But to dissenters of the June 19 ceasefire, the ceasefire was at least a chance to prepare for a war with Hamas, especially when political conditions were more favorable.
Hamas cannot be destroyed and senior Israeli leaders know this. Hamas cannot be destroyed because it is simply too entrenched in Gaza. Trying to engage Hamas on a military level has proved to be a failure as its armed resistance against Israel only serves to bolster Hamas’ mass popularity and makes the PLO appear weak and unproductive with its negotiations with Israel. Hamas is not a small isolated group but a sociopolitical movement entrenched in Palestinian society with a broad social and political appeal among Palestinians. Israel’s most realistic option to stop rocket fire from Gaza is to actually act upon an agreed ceasefire in which it opens Gaza’s borders and stops arresting and killing Palestinians without provocation. The IDF impressively achieved many tactical successes and it performed better in Gaza than it did in Lebanon, largely because Hamas is a less formidable foe than Hezbollah. But this does not matter because the war against Hamas is still a strategic failure. And to have tarnished Israel’s international image and inflicted another brutal, unforgiving war on the Palestinian population for no real lasting strategic gain is especially reprehensible. And unless Israel negotiates and implements a durable ceasefire, Israel will fail to stop the rocket fire, and therefore its once hard-earned deterrent will be diminished, not strengthened. In Operation Cast Lead, Israel's superior military power was used in a way that did not at all improve its long-term strategic position in the region.
A second factor in Israel’s decision to attack Hamas was mounting pressure from the upcoming Israeli national elections set to take place on February 10. As Foreign Minister Livni, Defense Minister Barak, and the resurgent Likud Party’s Netanyahu vied for the Israeli Premiership, the Israeli cabinet approved a war against Hamas in Gaza. The triumvirate that would oversee the war—Olmert, Livni, and Barak—had been constantly criticized by increasingly popular hawkish Netanyahu “for not being tough enough on Hamas and rocket-fire from Gaza.” This pressured the triumvirate coalition of Labor and Kadima to take a more aggressive approach to Hamas in order to satisfy Israeli voters at the expense of right-wing Likud. Since Livni and Barak were best known for their ongoing but fruitless peace negotiations with the Palestinians, both had the opportunity to gain favor with Israelis by leading Israel in a successful war with Hamas. Both aimed to convince Israeli voters that they could lead the country and do what was necessary in times of crisis, especially for Livni since she is a woman and never served in the IDF unlike Barak. "If anything, she's been identified with the negotiations with the Palestinians," said one senior Israeli official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "But at some point, her advisers started telling her she needed to turn to the right." Former Prime Minister Olmert and his Kadima Party’s reputation suffered significant political clout after 2006’s heavily criticized and failed invasion of Lebanon, as well as Olmert’s corruption charges. Operation Cast Lead, however, was Olmert’s chance to leave the Israeli Premiership on a high note with a successful war against Hamas. He, too, had been repositioning himself towards the right because “although he had initially hoped to revive his sullied reputation through a peace deal with the Palestinian Authority, he now appears to be banking on a successful operation in Gaza to help erase the stain of the Lebanon war, which was considered a debacle by many Israelis.” Netanyahu had always pushed for a more aggressive policy against Hamas in Gaza and was “well positioned to capitalize on Israeli anxiety if the rockets continue to fly.” When Hamas retaliated against Israel with its rocket fire in November and after the six-month truce expired in failure, the upcoming February 10 elections pressured Livni and Barak to immediately resort to using military force. During a research trip throughout the Occupied West Bank, many Palestinians repeatedly portrayed to this author a widespread belief that internal Israeli politics had some responsibility for the war against Hamas. They say that “whenever Israelis prepare to vote… Palestinians suffer from Israeli shows of strength” because “traditionally in Israel, violence during election campaigns has favored the more hawkish candidate.” Likud’s Netanyahu won the Premiership in 1996 against a backdrop of a campaign of Hamas suicide attacks inside Israel and an IDF offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Likud’s Sharon won in both 2001 and 2003 during the Second Intifada. More recently, Netanyahu is currently the Prime Minister-designate and was chosen by President Peres to form the new government.
Third, before Israel’s war against Hamas started “the likely date for expected fireworks in the region was January 9, the day Hamas had long argued that Mr Abbas's term ended, and on which they vowed they would stop recognizing him as PA president.” Hamas repeatedly stated that it wouldn't recognize Mahmoud Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority after his term expired on January 9. But with Israel’s war against it in Gaza, Hamas said that although it no longer recognizes Abbas as president, they have said the appropriate time to deal with the political issue was not now. By going to war against Hamas at that exact time, Israel gave itself the “opportunity to decide whether Abbas will lose his legitimacy before some of his nation, or will secure continued Fatah rule in the West Bank.” The Palestinian political situation threatens to boost Hamas and undermine Abbas, who maintains security coordination with Israel and is viewed by Israel as more willing to compromise and make concessions in negotiations over a peace deal with Israel. Because of Israel’s offensive in Gaza, however, “Abbas will remain in power for a while longer, since Hamas will be unable to mobilize its supporters in order to force him to resign.” Moreover, Israel hoped that with the threat from Gaza ended the pressure will grow on the Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to concede more on the much disputed issues of borders and control of Jerusalem. At a January 2009 meeting with this author at the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ramallah, Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmed Subuh, expressed his view that Israel's offensive in Gaza is more than an act of self-defense against years of Hamas rocket fire into southern Israel. He sees it as a tactical move against continuing the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks over the most divisive issues of borders, Palestinian refugees and control of Jerusalem. At a January 2009 meeting with this author at the home of Ahmed Qurei, the Chief Palestinian Negotiator and former Palestinian Prime Minister, in Abu Dis in East Jerusalem, he explained that by fomenting a disunity among Palestinian nationalism, Israel can claim that there is no reliable Palestinian partner with whom to negotiate a peace agreement and can delay the peace process by further pursuing changing facts on the ground. Israel's war against Hamas has actually undermined Palestinian support for Abbas and the ongoing peace talks. At a January 2009 meeting with this author at the Palestinian Authority Headquarters in Ramallah, Dr. Rafiq Husseini, the Chief of Staff to President Abbas, explains that the “Palestinian people think they can get more in 3 years of armed resistance than 10 years of negotiations. The Gaza war only strengthens Hamas more." Hamas has further surged in popularity at the expense of marginalizing President Abbas. Most of the emotional crowd at a Ramallah protest described to this author that the "massacre" in Gaza has invoked sympathy and support for Hamas’ resistance in Gaza. Israel’s war against Hamas has made the Palestinian Authority’s image and its control of the West Bank more ineffective than it already is, and support for its peace talks with Israel seems weaker than ever.
Finally, Israel decided to take action now as opposed to last summer or earlier in the fall as a result of the period of transition in the US administration because “the Bush administration rarely exerted constraint on Israel and would certainly stand by in its waning days, while Barack Obama [refused to offer his comments on the Gaza operation and] would not likely want to begin his presidency with a major confrontation with Israel.” In the The Washington Post, a Bush administration official explained that Israel went to war against Hamas precisely now "because they want it to be over before the next administration comes in. They can't predict how the next administration will handle it. And this is not the way they want to start with the new administration." Israel took this opportunity during the winter holidays and during the US political transition because it was the longest possible timeframe to go to war against Hamas with the least amount of pressure from the international community for an immediate ceasefire. Indeed, Israel's most provocative action and the critical turning point that undermined and broke the ceasefire was on November 4 when the international community was focused instead on the US elections and the IDF entered Gaza and killed six members of Hamas.
In a January 9 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman put forth his argument that although Israel could secure several short-term tactical goals of invading Gaza, these would be far outweighed by the strategic risks and costs to its overall security position. He asks:
“Has Israel somehow blundered into a steadily escalating war without a clear strategic goal, or at least one it can credibly achieve? Will Israel end in empowering an enemy in political terms that it defeated in tactical terms? Will Israel’s actions seriously damage the US position in the region, any hope of peace, as well as moderate Arab regimes and voices in the process? To be blunt, the answer so far seems to be yes.”
Israel cannot destroy Hamas and even if it was able to, neither Israel nor the US and its Arab allies can afford the regional strategic cost. If Israel wants to guarantee a cessation of rocket fire from Gaza it must respect international law and end its siege of Gaza. Similar to Hezbollah in 2006, Hamas’ minimum conditions for victory require it to just survive a war with Israel. Therefore, the long-term, political and strategic outcomes of the recent invasions of Lebanon and Gaza were severely counterproductive for Israel and US interests in the region, since they primarily resulted in garnering more popular support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel’s long-term overall security situation is more at risk the less influence the US and its Arab allies have in the ongoing struggle for the Middle East against the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas Axis. Israel’s war in Gaza has exemplified its politically poor overall security position and it remains out of reach for the time being of any kind of secure political existence because it has failed to gain acceptance from its Arab neighbors. The only real guarantee of Israel’s long-term survival is not in its vastly superior military but in becoming a recognized part of the regional state system and economy by negotiating diplomatic recognition from the Arab nations and achieving a lasting acceptance as a part of the Middle Eastern political system. No matter what happened on the battlefield, like the ill-fated 2006 invasion of Lebanon, Israel’s invasion of Gaza was doomed from the beginning because it is Israel’s Iron Wall strategy that poses the real dangerous risk to Israel’s overall long-term security position in the Middle East.
