I spent nearly 2 months in Lebanon during the summer of 2008 studying Arabic at LAU in Beirut. I almost had to cancel the trip altogether when sectarian violence broke out in early May and brought the country to the brink of another brutal civil war. The conflict was diffused but the high tensions and hostility between Lebanon's rival sects continued after the Doha Agreement in late May and continued into the summer while I was there. I wrote this gem for my Diplomatic History of the Middle East class and is based on a lot of what I learned while I was in Lebanon. I actually arrived in Beirut after Hezbollah had just ended its occupation of Downtown Beirut. During the trip I had met with Walid Jumblatt (leader of the Druze), Nicholas Noe (editor of Voice of Hezbollah), Timor Goksel (UN Peacekeeper in South Lebanon), and many other experts on the ongoing situation in Lebanon.
This was Beirut a few weeks before I arrived.
Civil Unrest
Lebanese Army
Militants
This is on Hamra Road. I remember I used to walk down it almost every day in the summer since it's only a few blocks from LAU.
Lebanon is a country of ubiquitous duality. Mainly split between Sunnis, Shi'ites, Christians, and Druze, the Lebanese melting pot of cultures has repeatedly sowed the seeds of conflict and war throughout Lebanon's long-troubled history. In Lebanon’s most recent conflict is the balance of power struggle in the national government—between the anti-Syrian and pro-West March 14 Alliance and the March 8 opposition—in the macrocosmic context of the clash for control of not only tiny Lebanon but the wider Middle East between the West with its Arab allies and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. The high tensions finally exploded into armed conflict in May 2008 when Hezbollah violently seized and overran Sunni West Beirut and sectarian violence spread throughout the country as Lebanon was plunged to the brink of another sectarian civil war. Although the subsequent Doha Agreement signed on May 21 ended Lebanon’s 18-month domestic crisis, the worst political instability and sectarian violence since its brutal civil war (1975-1990), the agreement is more of a temporary settlement than a final solution as it fails to address and resolve the grievances that led to the crisis—especially Hezbollah’s arms—and therefore is ultimately a defeat for the West and its Arab allies who were forced to concede to the terms of the Hezbollah-led opposition.
The immediate causes of Lebanon’s 18-month political crisis go back to the 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah and the subsequent aftermath. To properly acknowledge the aftermath effects of the 2006 War, it is important to observe the domestic context in which the war occurred. On Valentine’s Day 2005, anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated by a massive truck bomb in Beirut. Many suspected Syria’s involvement and under immense international pressure and Lebanon’s anti-Syrian Cedar Revolution, Syria finally withdrew all its troops from Lebanon in 2005, ending a 29-year military occupation. But after the assassination, the Lebanese government eventually dissolved and Lebanon’s domestic politics basically split into two bitter rival camps in the power vacuum left by the departing Syrians. “One Lebanon is represented by a coalition of mainly Sunnis, Druze, and Christians that coalesced following the assassination of the former prime minister and Sunni Muslim Rafiq al-Hariri.”1 The anti-Syrian and pro-Western March 14 Alliance is composed of mostly Sunni and Druze and led by Saad Hariri, the son of slain former PM Hariri. The opposition, March 8, is composed of mostly Shi’a and led by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Amal. Christians are mostly split between the opposing factions, although the majority of Christians shifted to the opposition after their leader, Michel Aoun, was shut out of the 2005 elections. In the June 2005 general elections, the anti-Syria and pro-West faction won a majority in Parliament (the first time in fifteen years) and in the Cabinet, although Hezbollah officials gained minister positions in the Cabinet for the first time and the March 14 bloc was unable to secure a two-thirds majority in Parliament.
Before the much delayed internationally-backed ceasefire finally ended the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel had invaded Lebanon with the dual aim of destroying Hezbollah’s militia and rescuing its two captured soldiers, whose capture by Hezbollah fighters on July 12, 2006 provoked the brutal Israeli war machine’s response. The Israeli Army failed to accomplish its goals, as Hezbollah fighters, though outgunned and overmatched, successfully confronted and halted the much more advanced IDF invasion force. In the end, the war was therefore seen as a victory for Hezbollah as its political standing in Lebanon and in the region immensely surged after the war and its underestimated militia (considered the best guerilla army in the world) was perceived as having defeated the theoretically invincible IDF (considered the 4th best professional army in the world). By contrast, the pro-Western Lebanese government in power during the war was seen as incompetent for its failure to confront Israel and effectively rebuild Lebanon’s destroyed infrastructure in the aftermath. In an interview in Beirut between the author and journalist Nicholas Noe, he pointed out that according to a poll of Arabs across the Middle East, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah quickly became the most popular leader in the Arab world overnight.2 “[Hezbollah’s] impressive and rapid response to the needs of those whose homes and lives were ravaged…further consolidated Hezbollah’s impressive base of support.”3 The legend of Israel’s invincible army and its longtime deterrent power against its enemies was shattered in 2000 and further disproved in 2006, both times by Hezbollah. Hassan Nasrallah’s popularity is due to the fact that in the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, he is the only Arab leader to expel Israeli forces from occupied land through armed conflict.4 Hezbollah recognized its increased potential power after its “divine victory” in the war and sought to exercise its new political leverage to its advantage within Lebanon by directly challenging the government for power and increased Shi’a representation.
After the war’s end, Hassan Nasrallah sought to capitalize on Hezbollah’s increased political and military standing after the war and urged the opposition to protest the current government. In November 2006, the opposition withdrew Hezbollah and Amal ministers (plus one Christian minister) from the cabinet; thus the government was now illegitimate and unconstitutional since not all sects (Shi’a) were properly represented according to Lebanon’s constitution. In December, Hezbollah and the opposition began a massive political protest campaign directly challenging the government and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Siniora (a Hariri ally and pro-Western) and occupied downtown Beirut in an attempt to paralyze the government and enforce its own terms on it. Nasrallah called Siniora illegitimate and a “tool of the West” and the opposition refused to recognize him as the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Anti-government protests periodically escalated into riots and sporadic sectarian fighting spread from the capital throughout the country. “Hezbollah is using its arms and enhanced political standing in the Islamic world to attempt to change the delicate political balance of Lebanon’s sectarian government in its favor,” and Nasrallah challenged Siniora to “either agree to a new consensus arrangement, with a Hezbollah veto over all government measures, or face widespread demonstrations and other forms of organized pressure.”5 The opposition demanded a national unity government in which it would hold more than one-third of Parliament, thus giving it veto power over any legislation (especially concerning Hezbollah’s arms) and the power to dissolve the government. The opposition was additionally trying to hold early parliamentary elections to regain a majority in Parliament, something Hezbollah was sure of in the aftermath of its success and increased support after the war. The opposition refused to back down until the government “either accepted a national unity government or agreed to call elections.”6 But March 14 was simultaneously aiming to hold early presidential elections to replace pro-Syrian President Lahoud, who stayed in power even after the Cedar Revolution. March 14’s priority after the war was “to stop Hezbollah from using its arms and recently enhanced political standing from changing the sectarian system’s domestic political and economic balance.”7 The two factions remained deadlocked for months after both sides refused the other’s demands. Matters were further complicated when President Lahoud’s term ended in November 2007, and the presidency remained vacant as the two sides still remained deadlocked over a power-sharing agreement in the government. Lebanon was effectively left without a president for six months and a functioning government for over a year.
Like most conflicts in the Middle East, the Lebanese political deadlock concerns larger implications regarding both regional and global powers. The conflict in Lebanon pitted the West (especially the US) and its Arab allies (especially Saudi Arabia), who support March 14, against the alliance between Iran and Syria that supports March 8. “This alliance challenges the US, Israel, and Washington’s Arab allies for control of the Middle East.”8 The struggle over Lebanon was not just for control of the tiny country but is a wider regional battle between pro-Western and anti-Western forces that are using Lebanon to fight their proxy wars. “Hezbollah sought to increase the opposition’s share in the government, allowing it to block any potential legislation that threatened the party’s interests or those of its allies in Damascus and Tehran.”9 It is due to this complex relationship between domestic and regional dimensions that Lebanon remains so important to both sides. Instability in Lebanon both feeds and is fed by regional instability. The central issue at stake is simply power and balance of power, with a sectarian division (Sunni and Shi’a) underlying the ongoing conflict. "This is more and more becoming a Sunni-Shi'a conflict. It really does feel like Iraq," says journalist Nir Rosen.10 The Lebanese government’s refusal to give in to the opposition demands is due to US policy that would not simply let Iran get the advantage in Lebanon, “especially since it might well benefit Iran’s power projection into the wider Middle East.”11 This is a proxy war with the US and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran and Syria on the other. The stakes are high as Iran and Syria would find it unacceptable to let Hezbollah be contained, and the US and Saudi Arabia would find it unacceptable to let Iran and Syria control Lebanon through Hezbollah. As one Druze official simply put it, “If you lose Lebanon, you lose the Middle East.”12
Nasrallah had declared that the situation could remain deadlocked until the 2009 elections since he recognized the significant implications if the opposition resorted to using its arms against fellow Lebanese and escalated the crisis into armed conflict and risked a possible second civil war. Hezbollah’s occupation of downtown Beirut was strictly a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign. But on May 6, 2008, the government preemptively cracked down on Hezbollah’s telecommunications system and replaced the security chief at Beirut’s airport, a Hezbollah loyalist. The government argued that Hezbollah’s telecommunications system was illegal unless it would be absorbed into the national system. But Hezbollah argued that its telecommunications system was synonymous with its weapons and arms as it was vital to its military operations against Israel (especially during the 2006 War) and could not incorporate it into Lebanon’s because it had been infiltrated and monitored by Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad. On May 8, 2008, Nasrallah stated the government’s actions were a “declaration of war” on Hezbollah and he would be forced to take action to defend Hezbollah’s precious arms. Abandoning its longtime promise to Lebanon to never use its arms against Lebanese, Hezbollah was forced to show the government its seriousness in protecting its arms. The long-simmering tensions of the political crisis abruptly deteriorated into widespread sectarian fighting in Beirut and throughout Lebanon. Minutes after Nasrallah’s speech, Hezbollah fighters boldly took to the streets of Beirut and assaulted through Sunni West Beirut. Hezbollah, whose military wing is stronger than Lebanon’s Army, easily overran West Beirut as it routed and effectively disarmed Sunni gunmen loyal to the government, essentially capturing and controlling over half of the capital after just six hours of urban warfare. Fighting would continue for another two days as Sunni fighters attempted counterattacks but Hezbollah and its Amal allies remained in complete control of Beirut. The government condemned Hezbollah’s offensive and Saudi Arabia (who backs and supports the Sunni loyalists) charged it with attempting a coup by seizing Beirut. With control of the south, downtown, and now the west, Hezbollah paralyzed life in the city and blocked the road to the airport, thus closing Lebanon’s only air link to the outside world. Over the next few days, the violence further escalated and fighting spread throughout the country to Sidon in the south to the Chouf Mountains in the east and to Tripoli in the north.
The Lebanese Army refused to intervene in the fighting and remained neutral as Sunnis and Shi’a intensely battled in Beirut. The Lebanese Army is the only truly national aspect of Lebanon because it does not split itself over sectarian divisions like the rest of the county. Fearing another disastrous split among the Lebanese Army along sectarian lines, as occurred during the civil war, top commanders refused to intervene in the fighting as such a move would’ve only escalated and expanded the violence. It is also worth noting that “around 70 percent of the Lebanese Army’s troops are Shi’a (because they are the poorest community in Lebanon)” and as a result “the army is certainly not going to take Hezbollah on”13 as most soldiers are sympathetic towards, or even admirable of, Hezbollah and its more powerful and well-trained military wing. The Lebanese Army pledged to resolve the fighting by retracting the government’s measures and allowing Hezbollah to keep its telecommunications system and reinstating the security chief at the airport. The Lebanese Army called for all militants to withdraw from the streets and after Hezbollah handed over control of positions captured from Sunnis to the Army, Lebanese soldiers started to deploy throughout the city on May 13 strictly to prevent any more fighting and to diffuse the conflict. Although the immediate fighting had ended after almost erupting into civil war (it was the worst internal fighting Lebanon had seen since its civil war) the two factions still remained deadlocked in a political crisis and unless both sides could reach a formal agreement, the next outbreak of armed conflict would inevitably lead to a new civil war.
Recognizing the implications if the dangerous instability and civil unrest in Lebanon possibly spread throughout the region if not contained, Qatar’s Prince Hamad called for all Lebanese political parties to the negotiating table in Doha. All attendees were tasked with resolving the 18-month political crisis to avoid an inevitable civil war which would eventually drag in the rest of the region like the first Lebanese civil war had. On May 16, after 82 dead in a week, the Lebanese sent off their leaders with the message, “if you don’t agree, don’t come back.” Lebanese political leaders traveled to Doha (except Nasrallah because of security concerns) and held a national dialogue over the course of the next few days focusing on ending the current political crisis and ensuring a lasting peace among Lebanese society. An agreement was finally reached on May 21 and the seemingly unending 18-month period of political crisis, bombings, instability, riots, assassinations, civil unrest, and almost civil war was finally brought to an end. The parties agreed to immediately elect Army Chief Michel Sleiman as the next president and to form a national unity government in which the opposition would be granted eleven minister posts in the Cabinet. The parties also succeeded in passing a new electoral law redrawing constituencies in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Further points in the agreement stressed the prohibition of utilizing force to achieve political gains, although it did not contain any stipulations regarding a violation of this. Immediately upon the agreement’s acceptance, the Hezbollah-led opposition finally ended its occupation of downtown Beirut and on May 25 General Sleiman was finally elected to be President.
The Doha Agreement in the international context was a definitive victory for Iran and Syria, as its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, emerged with even more political power in the Lebanese government. “Iran demonstrated that it, not the United States, is the central power broker.”14 The deal “was quietly opposed by the U.S., in part because it would increase the formal power of Hezbollah within the Lebanese government.”15 and “the abandonment of the government's demand to dismantle Hizbollah's secret telecommunication system was a final seal of its failure.”16 The insufficient backing of March 14 was what led to the Lebanese government being forced to make concessions to March 8. At a meeting at his private compound in the Chouf Mountains in central Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze, complained to the author, “Where was the United States when we tried to fight off Hezbollah?”17 The Saudi backing and support of the Sunni bloc was also embarrassed when Beirut was so easily captured by Shi’a fighters, and the ineffective Sunni militias (armed by Saudi Arabia) in Beirut were routed and disarmed by the opposition. “[The Sunni militias] just disappeared and caused a great sense of betrayal and shock among Sunnis."18 During a conversation between the author and journalist Gwynne Dyer, he stated that the US has given more than $400 million to the Lebanese Army in an attempt to bolster it as a counterweight to Hezbollah, but the Lebanese Army still remains vastly outmatched by Hezbollah, and it stood by as a neutral force while Hezbollah defeated the US’s Sunni and Druze allies.19 “But even with the U.S. putting international pressure on Hezbollah and Iran, and providing ‘practical assistance’ to the Lebanese Army to deal with domestic security threats… Hezbollah has drawn the red lines. So far, the army hasn't crossed them.”20 With momentum on their side after the 2006 War with Israel and the 2008 Doha Agreement, Iran and Syria were able to further their successes in Lebanon with the opposition’s victory. Although Syria had left Lebanon militarily in 2005 after the Cedar Revolution, it still exercises a significant degree of influence through Hezbollah. President Bush’s policy in Lebanon was shattered as his once proclaimed Cedar Revolution was voided. The Doha Agreement exemplified decreased influence from the US and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, as the deal was brokered not by them but by the Qataris, and in the end Iranian and Syrian interests triumphed with Hezbollah’s gains. Hezbollah displayed its impressive military strength in 2006 against Israel and in 2008 against the March 14 Alliance, and, like its successes in 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah was able to achieve more through intense warfare than through prolonged diplomacy, setting a dangerous precedent for further conflicts in the Middle East. In fact it was only the following year in 2007 when its ally Hamas violently seized the Gaza Strip from Fatah. As Robert Fisk points out, Hizbollah has just won a domestic war in Lebanon, as total as Hamas's war in Gaza.”21 With little expense to itself, "Hezbollah used force and won. (The ruling bloc) had to retreat and we are back to an internal accommodation of Hezbollah.”22 The Doha Agreement had essentially shifted the balance of power in the Middle East in Iran and Syria’s favor.
In the domestic arena of Lebanon’s infamous politics, although early parliamentary elections wouldn’t take place, the new electoral law in the Doha Agreement redrew constituencies in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley so as to give the opposition an increased advantage in the 2009 elections to regain its majority in the Parliament. Siniora will remain Prime Minister until then and will be replaced by Hariri (or someone else in March 14), but the new cabinet will consist of eleven posts for the opposition. Furthermore, three posts are reserved for the president to choose. President Sleiman is seen as pro-Syrian and pro-Hezbollah and was not a favorite for March 14. Hezbollah gained a domestic victory with the presidential election as it was not a member of March 14 that was elected. Therefore, for the most part the three posts left up to the president will most likely be Hezbollah members or allies, bringing the total of March 8 ministers to fourteen and granting the opposition with veto power over any anti-opposition legislation, particularly the sensitive issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. "The basic problem that was illustrated in the July war has not been resolved [in the Doha Agreement], and that is the issue of Hezbollah's weapons."23 Many thought Nasrallah had made a huge mistake when Hezbollah used its arms against Lebanese for the first time. Hezbollah had always promised not to because they were solely meant as a resistance to Israel—since the Army was too weak—and this is what gave it legitimacy in arming itself. Adding more legitimacy to Hezbollah’s arms, an August 2008 government draft policy stated: “[it is] the right of Lebanon's people, the army and the resistance to liberate all its territories.”24
Although the Taif Agreement, UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, and the Doha Agreement call for “all militias to disarm” in Lebanon, Hezbollah and many of its supporters contend that this does not apply to Hezbollah. They argue that Hezbollah is not a militia but a “national resistance” and its arms are needed to defend Lebanon against Israeli aggression, along with what is perceived as an Israeli occupation of Lebanon’s Shebaa Farms. Nevertheless, Hezbollah had gained another success because any legislation that March 14 would try to pass forcing Hezbollah to disarm would simply be vetoed by the opposition. Hezbollah will not disarm or absorb itself into the weaker Lebanese Army anytime soon.
In the ongoing struggle between domestic, regional and global forces, Lebanon has historically oscillated between victories and defeats for both pro-Western and anti-Western factions. The US-Saudi Arabia-March 14 Alliance had scored a victory with the Cedar Revolution in 2005 but the tables have turned since then with the 2008 Doha Agreement. The incumbent Lebanese government is facing a resurgent Hezbollah-led opposition with increased political standing and leverage, as well as a definitive armed advantage that it will definitely not simply give up. The US and Saudi Arabia have effectively lost a certain degree of influence in Lebanon to the alliance of Iran and Syria that now has the upper hand. The Doha Agreement exemplifies a defeat for the US-Saudi Arabia-March 14 Alliance but more importantly it also represents a dangerous precedent for Lebanon itself. If Hezbollah is willing to use brute force to achieve political gains, then there is still the possibility that another armed conflict could erupt next year in the wake of the 2009 parliamentary elections or anytime in the future. Like all other theoretical agreements in Lebanon’s long-troubled and tragic past, the Doha Agreement is only a temporary settlement as Lebanon will continue to be dragged through further inevitable violent instability before the country ever achieves a lasting civil peace.
