I wrote this gem for my Arab-Israeli Relations class with Professor Alexander Bligh. A lot of it comes from the independent research I did in Israel and the Palestinian West Bank over winter break during Israel's war with Hamas. Enjoy.
Who will save Israel from itself?
The Israeli Defense Forces’ Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, beginning on December 27, 2008, was justified in the context of Israel’s right to self-defense as a sovereign nation against indiscriminate rocket attacks from Palestinian militants; or so the simple widespread perception goes. The actual reality, however, suggests Israel had other objectives than commonly assumed. Further examination not only proves the Israeli claim to be a distorted view of the conflict but that it is much more complex and complicated than portrayed in the mainstream media’s coverage. If Israel’s only goal was to cease the rocket attacks coming from the Gaza Strip to provide immediate security for Israeli citizens, it would have adhered better to the June 19 ceasefire and worked before its expiration to negotiate a long-term ceasefire with Hamas. Israel’s invasion of Gaza was not a justified war of self-defense or even of necessity but it was clearly a war of choice and of opportunity. The broader reasons why Israel invaded Gaza can be attributed to other factors that are not related at all to security but more relevant to the political context at the time including the IDF’s diminished deterrence capability, the upcoming Israeli elections, the marginalized Palestinian President Abbas and Palestinian Authority, and the transition period of the US administration. Furthermore, Israel’s invasion of Gaza has thoroughly undermined Israeli and US national interests and ultimately failed to provide a long-term improvement in Israel’s overall security situation in the region.
Israel and Hamas signed a six-month ceasefire on June 19, 2008 in which Hamas agreed to end rocket attacks against Israel in exchange for Israel ending its siege on Gaza by fully opening all border crossings. The ceasefire expired on December 19 and Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza on December 27. Israel and Hamas contend that the other had not fully respected the ceasefire and routinely violated it. In mainstream Western media, the Israeli and US narrative claim that Hamas, as a terrorist organization, was the main violator of the ceasefire and Israel was merely exercising its natural right to self-defense against rocket attacks coming from the Gaza Strip because Hamas refused to negotiate an extension of the ceasefire. This may be the widespread and accepted belief but it simply is not true. The ceasefire began in June 2008 and both sides had agreed to cease all military operations against the other. Hamas was required to cease any rockets being fired into Israel (whether from Hamas or other Palestinian factions), and Israel had to lift its blockade of Gaza. According to Israel’s Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), despite Israel's failure to fully lift its closing of Gaza’s border crossings the June 19 agreement actually resulted in Hamas significantly decreasing the rockets fired into Israel from hundreds in the weeks before the June 19 ceasefire to a total of less than twenty between June 19 and November 4 and only two the last two months of September and October. Israeli Defense Minister Barak and the ITIC were surprised with Hamas’ adherence to the ceasefire terms and its effective policies of cracking down on anyone firing rockets at Israel. But the significant event that first broke the ceasefire was on November 4 when the IDF conducted a raid into Gaza which resulted in the deaths of six Hamas members. Hamas and other Palestinian groups, whom the ITIC maintains were “careful to maintain the ceasefire,” fired rockets into Israel as retaliation to Israel’s violation of the ceasefire. The ITIC’s December 31 report confirmed that the June 19 truce was only "sporadically violated, and then not by Hamas but instead by ... ‘rogue terrorist organisations’" that were opposed to Hamas and whose interests included undermining the Hamas government by violating its ceasefire with Israel. Instead, "the escalation and erosion of the lull arrangement" only occurred after Israel provocatively killed six Hamas members on November 4 and then followed up with a further provocation on November 5 when Israel completely closed all of Gaza’s border crossings, even to critical aid shipments, that only intensified Israel’s siege and threatened a dangerous escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Despite the ceasefire being effective for only the Israelis, after the ceasefire expired on December 19, Hamas offered a renewed ceasefire to Israel on December 21, but only on condition that Israel actually ended its blockade this time in accordance with international law which prohibits collective punishment of a civilian population and defines any kind of blockade as an act of war. The June 19 ceasefire with Hamas was actually working quite well from Israel’s perspective until the IDF’s incursion into Gaza on November 4. Israel refused to renew the ceasefire because its intentions of Operation Cast Lead were simply not limited to mere rockets. By actually adhering to the June 19 ceasefire by lifting the blockade or renewing a ceasefire with Hamas in December, Israel would have guaranteed security for its citizens but it didn’t even try to negotiate with Hamas which could have at least mostly erased the rocket threat for another six months. In rejecting Hamas’ offer and never fully opening Gaza’s border crossings, Israel was placing its wider political interests as more important than the threat of Hamas rockets and therefore over the very safety and lives of Israel’s citizens. The Israelis only opened partially the border crossings with Gaza, and in late July Foreign Minister Livni declared that Gaza’s border crossings would never be fully opened unless Hamas released captured IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit, even though the original ceasefire clearly was not conditional to Corporal Shalit’s release. In an interview in Ha’aretz on December 22, IDF Brigadier General Shmuel Zakai, former commander of the IDF’s Gaza Division, severely criticized Israel’s violations of the ceasefire and for failing to see the potential strategic costs of its policies:
“[Israel failed] to take advantage of the calm to improve, rather than markedly worsen, the economic plight of the Palestinians of the Strip… When you create a tahdiyeh, and the economic pressure on the Strip continues, it is obvious that Hamas will try to reach an improved tahdiyeh, and that their way to achieve this is resumed Qassam fire… You cannot just land blows, leave the Palestinians in Gaza in the economic distress they’re in, and expect that Hamas will just sit around and do nothing.”
Instead, Israel not only sought to deter all future rocket attacks against Israel but to negotiate another ceasefire but this time with Israel possessing better negotiating leverage to achieve a ceasefire that is in Israel’s overall favor. Israel’s brutal 18-month blockade failed to achieve that goal so Israel took the opportunity to use its superior military to inflict massive, overwhelming damage against Hamas in order to corner it until it would agree to a ceasefire with conditions more favorable to Israel than the June 19 ceasefire, specifically the immediate release of Corporal Shalit. There were clearly alternatives to a military approach that were not exhausted enough or even attempted and more importantly, no ceasefire in Gaza will ever last or become effective unless both sides fully adhere to it, especially unless Israel completely lifts its siege. After the failed ceasefire expired on December 19, the IDF started its massive bombing campaign of Hamas civilian and military targets in Gaza on December 27. The Israelis rejected Hamas’ offer for a renewed ceasefire because its broader political interests went beyond its security against rocket attacks fired from Gaza.
First of all, the Israeli leadership was divided over the ceasefire even during its initial negotiating period, and Defense Minister Barak instructed the IDF to begin preparing for a war with Hamas while the ceasefire was being negotiated in June 2008. Many senior Israeli political and military leaders strongly opposed the June 19 ceasefire with Hamas, and looked for opportunities to reestablish Israel's legendary deterrent capability of using such overwhelming, massive force against its enemies that they would be discouraged to ever attack Israel. The legend of Israel’s invincible army and its longtime deterrent power against its enemies was shattered in 2000 and further disproved in 2006, both times against Hezbollah, as well as a result of Israel’s 2005 unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Stephen Walt points out that “its ability to use force to achieve larger strategic objectives has declined significantly over time.” And because of this Israelis have always emphasized in recent years the importance of restoring the IDF’s deterrence capability because although the IDF is the best military force in the Middle East and will undoubtedly win battles and achieve tactical successes, this does not necessarily lead to long-term improvements in Israel’s overall regional security situation. But to dissenters of the June 19 ceasefire, the ceasefire was at least a chance to prepare for a war with Hamas, especially when political conditions were more favorable.
Hamas cannot be destroyed and senior Israeli leaders know this. Hamas cannot be destroyed because it is simply too entrenched in Gaza. Trying to engage Hamas on a military level has proved to be a failure as its armed resistance against Israel only serves to bolster Hamas’ mass popularity and makes the PLO appear weak and unproductive with its negotiations with Israel. Hamas is not a small isolated group but a sociopolitical movement entrenched in Palestinian society with a broad social and political appeal among Palestinians. Israel’s most realistic option to stop rocket fire from Gaza is to actually act upon an agreed ceasefire in which it opens Gaza’s borders and stops arresting and killing Palestinians without provocation. The IDF impressively achieved many tactical successes and it performed better in Gaza than it did in Lebanon, largely because Hamas is a less formidable foe than Hezbollah. But this does not matter because the war against Hamas is still a strategic failure. And to have tarnished Israel’s international image and inflicted another brutal, unforgiving war on the Palestinian population for no real lasting strategic gain is especially reprehensible. And unless Israel negotiates and implements a durable ceasefire, Israel will fail to stop the rocket fire, and therefore its once hard-earned deterrent will be diminished, not strengthened. In Operation Cast Lead, Israel's superior military power was used in a way that did not at all improve its long-term strategic position in the region.
A second factor in Israel’s decision to attack Hamas was mounting pressure from the upcoming Israeli national elections set to take place on February 10. As Foreign Minister Livni, Defense Minister Barak, and the resurgent Likud Party’s Netanyahu vied for the Israeli Premiership, the Israeli cabinet approved a war against Hamas in Gaza. The triumvirate that would oversee the war—Olmert, Livni, and Barak—had been constantly criticized by increasingly popular hawkish Netanyahu “for not being tough enough on Hamas and rocket-fire from Gaza.” This pressured the triumvirate coalition of Labor and Kadima to take a more aggressive approach to Hamas in order to satisfy Israeli voters at the expense of right-wing Likud. Since Livni and Barak were best known for their ongoing but fruitless peace negotiations with the Palestinians, both had the opportunity to gain favor with Israelis by leading Israel in a successful war with Hamas. Both aimed to convince Israeli voters that they could lead the country and do what was necessary in times of crisis, especially for Livni since she is a woman and never served in the IDF unlike Barak. "If anything, she's been identified with the negotiations with the Palestinians," said one senior Israeli official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "But at some point, her advisers started telling her she needed to turn to the right." Former Prime Minister Olmert and his Kadima Party’s reputation suffered significant political clout after 2006’s heavily criticized and failed invasion of Lebanon, as well as Olmert’s corruption charges. Operation Cast Lead, however, was Olmert’s chance to leave the Israeli Premiership on a high note with a successful war against Hamas. He, too, had been repositioning himself towards the right because “although he had initially hoped to revive his sullied reputation through a peace deal with the Palestinian Authority, he now appears to be banking on a successful operation in Gaza to help erase the stain of the Lebanon war, which was considered a debacle by many Israelis.” Netanyahu had always pushed for a more aggressive policy against Hamas in Gaza and was “well positioned to capitalize on Israeli anxiety if the rockets continue to fly.” When Hamas retaliated against Israel with its rocket fire in November and after the six-month truce expired in failure, the upcoming February 10 elections pressured Livni and Barak to immediately resort to using military force. During a research trip throughout the Occupied West Bank, many Palestinians repeatedly portrayed to this author a widespread belief that internal Israeli politics had some responsibility for the war against Hamas. They say that “whenever Israelis prepare to vote… Palestinians suffer from Israeli shows of strength” because “traditionally in Israel, violence during election campaigns has favored the more hawkish candidate.” Likud’s Netanyahu won the Premiership in 1996 against a backdrop of a campaign of Hamas suicide attacks inside Israel and an IDF offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Likud’s Sharon won in both 2001 and 2003 during the Second Intifada. More recently, Netanyahu is currently the Prime Minister-designate and was chosen by President Peres to form the new government.
Third, before Israel’s war against Hamas started “the likely date for expected fireworks in the region was January 9, the day Hamas had long argued that Mr Abbas's term ended, and on which they vowed they would stop recognizing him as PA president.” Hamas repeatedly stated that it wouldn't recognize Mahmoud Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority after his term expired on January 9. But with Israel’s war against it in Gaza, Hamas said that although it no longer recognizes Abbas as president, they have said the appropriate time to deal with the political issue was not now. By going to war against Hamas at that exact time, Israel gave itself the “opportunity to decide whether Abbas will lose his legitimacy before some of his nation, or will secure continued Fatah rule in the West Bank.” The Palestinian political situation threatens to boost Hamas and undermine Abbas, who maintains security coordination with Israel and is viewed by Israel as more willing to compromise and make concessions in negotiations over a peace deal with Israel. Because of Israel’s offensive in Gaza, however, “Abbas will remain in power for a while longer, since Hamas will be unable to mobilize its supporters in order to force him to resign.” Moreover, Israel hoped that with the threat from Gaza ended the pressure will grow on the Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to concede more on the much disputed issues of borders and control of Jerusalem. At a January 2009 meeting with this author at the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ramallah, Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmed Subuh, expressed his view that Israel's offensive in Gaza is more than an act of self-defense against years of Hamas rocket fire into southern Israel. He sees it as a tactical move against continuing the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks over the most divisive issues of borders, Palestinian refugees and control of Jerusalem. At a January 2009 meeting with this author at the home of Ahmed Qurei, the Chief Palestinian Negotiator and former Palestinian Prime Minister, in Abu Dis in East Jerusalem, he explained that by fomenting a disunity among Palestinian nationalism, Israel can claim that there is no reliable Palestinian partner with whom to negotiate a peace agreement and can delay the peace process by further pursuing changing facts on the ground. Israel's war against Hamas has actually undermined Palestinian support for Abbas and the ongoing peace talks. At a January 2009 meeting with this author at the Palestinian Authority Headquarters in Ramallah, Dr. Rafiq Husseini, the Chief of Staff to President Abbas, explains that the “Palestinian people think they can get more in 3 years of armed resistance than 10 years of negotiations. The Gaza war only strengthens Hamas more." Hamas has further surged in popularity at the expense of marginalizing President Abbas. Most of the emotional crowd at a Ramallah protest described to this author that the "massacre" in Gaza has invoked sympathy and support for Hamas’ resistance in Gaza. Israel’s war against Hamas has made the Palestinian Authority’s image and its control of the West Bank more ineffective than it already is, and support for its peace talks with Israel seems weaker than ever.
Finally, Israel decided to take action now as opposed to last summer or earlier in the fall as a result of the period of transition in the US administration because “the Bush administration rarely exerted constraint on Israel and would certainly stand by in its waning days, while Barack Obama [refused to offer his comments on the Gaza operation and] would not likely want to begin his presidency with a major confrontation with Israel.” In the The Washington Post, a Bush administration official explained that Israel went to war against Hamas precisely now "because they want it to be over before the next administration comes in. They can't predict how the next administration will handle it. And this is not the way they want to start with the new administration." Israel took this opportunity during the winter holidays and during the US political transition because it was the longest possible timeframe to go to war against Hamas with the least amount of pressure from the international community for an immediate ceasefire. Indeed, Israel's most provocative action and the critical turning point that undermined and broke the ceasefire was on November 4 when the international community was focused instead on the US elections and the IDF entered Gaza and killed six members of Hamas.
In a January 9 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman put forth his argument that although Israel could secure several short-term tactical goals of invading Gaza, these would be far outweighed by the strategic risks and costs to its overall security position. He asks:
“Has Israel somehow blundered into a steadily escalating war without a clear strategic goal, or at least one it can credibly achieve? Will Israel end in empowering an enemy in political terms that it defeated in tactical terms? Will Israel’s actions seriously damage the US position in the region, any hope of peace, as well as moderate Arab regimes and voices in the process? To be blunt, the answer so far seems to be yes.”
Israel cannot destroy Hamas and even if it was able to, neither Israel nor the US and its Arab allies can afford the regional strategic cost. If Israel wants to guarantee a cessation of rocket fire from Gaza it must respect international law and end its siege of Gaza. Similar to Hezbollah in 2006, Hamas’ minimum conditions for victory require it to just survive a war with Israel. Therefore, the long-term, political and strategic outcomes of the recent invasions of Lebanon and Gaza were severely counterproductive for Israel and US interests in the region, since they primarily resulted in garnering more popular support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel’s long-term overall security situation is more at risk the less influence the US and its Arab allies have in the ongoing struggle for the Middle East against the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas Axis. Israel’s war in Gaza has exemplified its politically poor overall security position and it remains out of reach for the time being of any kind of secure political existence because it has failed to gain acceptance from its Arab neighbors. The only real guarantee of Israel’s long-term survival is not in its vastly superior military but in becoming a recognized part of the regional state system and economy by negotiating diplomatic recognition from the Arab nations and achieving a lasting acceptance as a part of the Middle Eastern political system. No matter what happened on the battlefield, like the ill-fated 2006 invasion of Lebanon, Israel’s invasion of Gaza was doomed from the beginning because it is Israel’s Iron Wall strategy that poses the real dangerous risk to Israel’s overall long-term security position in the Middle East.
